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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BRENT D. YOUNG,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

Supreme Court Case No.: 20010101-SC

v.
Category No. 15
SALT LAKE COUNTY and AARON D.
KENNARD, SALT LAKE COUNTY
SHERIFF,
Defendants and Appellants.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review this matter pursuant to Article 8 § 3 of
the Utah Constitution and Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)0')STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Whether a petition for judicial review of a governmental entity's denial of an
administrative appeal is timely filed when the petition is filed 26 days after the denial
and where the statute allows 30 days to file the petition? R. 84.

II.

Whether records of adjudicated disciplinary investigations of governmental
employees are public records under the Governmental Records Access Management
Act? R. 54.
1

III.

Whether a governmental entity can deny a party whose employment they terminated
access to records relevant to the termination by classifying the records as "protected"
under the Governmental Records Access Management Act? R. 97.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Because all the issues in this appeal are based upon the statutory interpretation of

Governmental Records Access Management Act, the standard of review is under the
correction-of-error standard. Graham v. Davis County Solid Waste Management, 979 P.2d
363 (Ut. App. 1999). In reviewing the district court's order, this Court may affirm a trial
court's decision on any proper ground, even if the trial court based its decision on a different
ground. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assoc, 752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1998).
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following statutory provisions are determinative or of central importance to this
appeal:
Utah Code Ann. §63-2-102
Utah Code Ann. §63-2-201
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-202
Utah Code Ann. §63-2-301
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-304
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404
Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal concerns a review of a governmental entity's denial of a Governmental
Records Access Management Act (hereinafter "GRAMA") request. The request was filed

2

by an employee whose employment was terminated by the governmental entity and was
submitted to acquire records relevant to the termination for an administrative proceeding
challenging the termination.
Brent Young (hereinafter "Young") was employed as a deputy for the Salt
Lake County Sheriff s Department (hereinafter "County"). On January 14,2001, Young was
disciplined and his employment was terminated by the County. Young subsequently
challenged his termination and appealed to the Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriffs Merit
Commission (hereinafter "Merit Commission"). To address the second of two issues before
the Merit Commission on the consistency and proportionality of his discipline, Young
submitted a GRAMA request for copies of disciplinary records of other deputies who were
investigated and disciplined for similar conduct. The County refused to provide Young
copies of all records he requested.
As a consequence of the County's refusal to provide Young with copies of the records
he requested, Young filed an action in the district court seeking judicial review of the
County's refusal. The district court heard the case on cross-motions for summary judgment.
The court granted Young's motion for summary judgment and denied the County's motion.
The County appealed the district court's summary judgment order which serves as the basis
for this appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Young was employed as a merit deputy sheriff with the County. R. 65. On January
14,2001, Young was disciplined and his employment was terminated by the County. R. 65.
3

According to the final order of his termination, Young was terminated for exercising poor
judgment in his interactions with a minor female by using his firearm in an unauthorized
manner and using certain language to interact with the minor that had the potential for sexual
innuendo. R. 65 and 123. Young challenged his termination and appealed it to the Merit
Commission. R. 49.
The County maintains a policy that any discipline must be consistent to that imposed
in similar cases, must be fair and must be appropriate or proportional to the conduct. R. 150.
To address the consistency and proportionality of his discipline before the Merit
Commission, Young submitted a GRAMA request with the County for copies of records of
disciplinary investigations of other deputies that involved conduct similar to the conduct for
which he was terminated. R. 50. In a correspondence dated March 14, 2000, the County
denied Young's request by stating that access to the records he requested were precluded
by Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19. R. 74. On March 28, 2000, Young administratively
appealed the denial. R. 76. On April 20, 2000, the County responded to the appeal denying
it in part and granting it in part. R. 80. In denying the request, the County maintained that
the requested records were classified as "protected" and therefore could not be released. R.
81-82. Further, the County contended that the requested records were also restricted by Utah
Code Ann. § 17-30-19. R. 82. On May 16, 2000, twenty six (26) days later, Young filed a
petition in the Third Judicial District Court seeking judicial review of the County's denial
of his request. R. 1.
On September 19,2000, the district court heard oral arguments on cross-motions for
4

summary judgment. R. 184. Young argued that the records were needed to compare them to
his case in order to review the consistency and proportionality of his discipline. T. 2. Young
specifically argued that he was only interested in adjudicated cases where the discipline was
sustained, and only needed the information about the conduct and the discipline not any
private information about a particular party. T. 3-4, 7. The County argued that their
classification of the requested records as "protected" was proper under GRAMA. T. 17-18.
In support of their argument, they cited the privacy concerns, both personal and professional,
of individuals referred to in the records. T. 18-19,22-23. The County did not raise any issue
about the burden of complying with the request. T. 16-29. The County also argued that it
was premature to consider whether Young's due process rights were violated because the
Merit Commission hearing had not occurred. T. 20-23. After considering oral arguments
from counsel, the court granted Young's motion and denied the County's. T. 45.
In granting Young's motion, the court did not rule that Young's due process rights
were violated, but rather that he had a due process interest in acquiring the records for his
administrative hearing challenging his termination because they were relevant to the
proceedings. R. 168. The court therefore ordered that Young was entitled to records of
other deputies relating to disciplinary charges and the resulting discipline that was imposed.
T. 46. However, the court accepted the concerns raised by the County regarding the private
information that may be contained in the records and ordered any private information to be
redacted. T. 46.
During the Merit Commission proceedings, Young has involved the Merit
5

Commission in his request for the records. R. 68 and 162. The Merit Commission has agreed
to Young's use of GRAMA to pursue the records and has agreed to continue the proceedings
until this matter is resolved. R. 68. As the County notes in their brief, addendum D, the
Merit Commission has recently ruled on its review of the records provided by the County.
However, the Merit Commission has not yet ruled on Young's response to their decision.
Addendum A.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Young's petition for judicial review of the County's denial of his GRAMA appeal
was timely filed under the plain meaning of the statute. The County's argument to the
contrary defies the plain meaning of the statute and the authority upon which they rely is
misplaced.
The records Young requested are public records by statutory definition. Because
they are public records Young is entitled to copies of the records he requested. The
County's arguments that the records are protected records or otherwise restricted by
statute are not persuasive because the requested records do no meet the statutory
classification of protected records and the statute upon which the County relies to argue
that access to the records is precluded is not applicable.
Finally, even if the records are protected, the district court followed the statutory
requirements to order their release. The intent of GRAMA is not to preclude access, but
rather to restrict. To achieving its intent, GRAMA provides a statutory framework within
which restricted records may be accessed and released upon compliance with the statute.
6

The district court followed the statutory framework by having jurisdiction over the
controversy, considered the appropriate interest in the records, properly balanced those
interests, placed restrictions on the records where appropriate and found sound authority
independent of GRAMA to order the release. The County's arguments that the district
court did not have jurisdiction and improperly relied on due process principles for
authority to order the release are without merit. The requested records are subject to
GRAMA thereby giving the district court jurisdiction to review Young's petition and the
County's reliance on Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19 to contend that the district court needed
authority independent of GRAMA to order release is in error because it does not apply to
the records.
ARGUMENT
I.
YOUNG TIMELY FILED HIS PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW UNDER THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE STATUTE.
Young filed his petition for judicial review twenty six (26) days after the county
responded to his request. Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404(2)(b)(i) requires a petition for
judicial review to be filed within thirty (30) days after a response. Nevertheless, the
County argues that the district court did not have jurisdiction over Young's petition for
judicial review of their denial of his GRAMA request because he failed to timely file his
petition. The County's argument relies on a couple of statutes. First, the County argues
that because they did not respond to Young's request within five (5) days after it was
7

filed Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-40l(5)(b) causes their failure to respond to be treated as a
denial of the request. The County then equates the denial with a complete failure to
respond and argues that because they failed to respond, albeit within the five (5) days of
Utah Code Ann. §63-2-401(5)(b), Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404(2)(b)(ii) applies and
provides Young with thirty five (35) days in which to file his petition for judicial review
from the date he filed his request. The County concludes that since Young failed to file
his petition within thirty five (35) days his petition is therefore untimely. The County's
argument is not cogent because it is contrary to the plain meaning of the statute and the
authority upon which they rely is misplaced.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404(2) provides:
(a)

A requester may petition for judicial review by the district court of a
governmental entity's determination as specified in Subsection 63-2-402(l)(b).

(b)

The requester shall file a petition no later than:
(i) 30 days after the governmental entity has responded to the records request
by either providing the requested records or denying the request in whole or
in part;
(ii) 35 days after the original request if the governmental entity failed to
respond to the request; or
(iii) 45 days after the original request for records if:
(A) the circumstances described in Subsection 63-2-40l(l)(b) occur;
and
(B) the chief administrative officer failed to make a determination
under Section 63-2-401.

In interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404, the well established rules of statutory
interpretation apply. Sullivan v. Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d 877, 880 (Utah 1993).
The rules provide that you first look to the plain language of the statute to give effect to its
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meaning and intent. Id. Only if the statute's language is ambiguous, do you look beyond the
statute to determine the statute's meaning. State v. Burns, 4 P.3d 795 (Utah 2000). When
the language of a statute "is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it
expresses, and no room is left for construction." Hanchett v. Burbidge, 202 P. 377, 380
(1921).
The language of Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404 is clear and unambiguous.
Subsection(2)(b)(i) plainly states that a party has thirty (30) days after the governmental
entity has responded to the GRAMA request to file a petition for judicial review. Utah Code
Ann. § 63-2-404(2)(b)(i). Young filed his GRAMA administrative appeal request with the
County on March 28, 2000. R. 76. Twenty three (23) days later in a correspondence dated
April 20, 2000, the County responded to the request by denying it in part and by granting
it in part. R. 16., 167. On May 16, 2000, twenty six (26) days after the County responded,
Young filed his petition for judicial review. Accordingly, Young's petition for judicial
review filed twenty six (26) days after the County's response is within the thirty (30) days
clearly provided for by Utah Code Ann. 63-2-404(2)(b)(i). See also, Graham v. Davis Co.
Solid Waste Management, 979 P.2d 363, 367 (Ut. App. 1999)(opinion notes 30 day period
to petition for judicial review following governmental entity's response to the request.).
Despite the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404(2)(b)(i), the County
nevertheless argues that Young's petition was filed untimely. The County's premises its
argument on Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-401(5)(b) to argue that it required the chief
administrative officer to "respond" to Young's request within five (5) days and because there
9

was no response within five days the failure was a denial of the request.

The County's

interest is to obviously equate their failure to act within five (5) days with a complete failure
to respond v/hich would cause the thirty five (35) day period of Utah Code Ann. § 63-2404(2)(b)(ii) to apply. However, Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-401 (5)(b) makes no mention of a
"response" to an appeal. Rather, it requires the chief administrative office to make a
"determination" on the appeal. Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-40l(5)(b). While the County's
argument seeks to equate the two verbs, their argument is not supported by GRAMA.
A brief review of the GRAMA statutes demonstrate that the word "determination",
as contemplated by GRAMA, concerns what classification the governmental entity places
the requested records in, not the response to the request. See, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2103(7), 63-2-401 and 63-2-404. Indeed, Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404(3) makes the
distinction between the words "determination" and "response" evident by its use of each
word differently. Finally, a common sense reading of Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-40l(5)(b)
defies the County's argument since a five (5) day window for a governmental entity to
"respond" to a GRAMA request is an unreasonably short amount of time. The amount of
time for mail service of the response alone may exceed five (5) days. Accordingly, the
County's argument that Young's period to file his petition started five (5) days after he made
his request is without merit because the statute relied upon by the County concerns a failure
to make a determination and not a response.
Moreover, the County's argument completely disregards the fact that they did respond
to Young's request. That fact is significant for two reasons. First, Utah Code Ann. § 63-210

404(2)(b)(ii) provides for a 35 day period to petition for judicial review only when the
"governmental entity failed to respond to the request." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2404.(Emphasis added). Because the County responded to Young's request, the County's
argument that Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404(2)(b)(ii) applies is not accurate. Secondly, the
County's response was made on April 20, 2000, 23 days after Young submitted his request
on March 28, 2000. Thus, the County responded to Young's request within the 35 days
Young would have had to file his petition if the County did not respond. Because the County
responded, particularly because they did so within the 35 days, the 35 day period
contemplated by Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-404(2)(b)(ii) would no longer apply, and instead,
the 30 day period of Utah Code Ann. 63-2-404(2)(b)(i) would apply. Thus, the fact that the
County responded to Young's GRAMA request makes their argument that his petition was
untimely filed unpersuasive and contrary to the plain meaning of the statute.
II.

BECAUSE THE RECORDS YOUNG REQUESTED ARE
PUBLIC RECORDS, THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY
ORDERED THE RELEASE OF THOSE RECORDS.
The records Young requested are public records by definition under Utah Code
Ann. § 63-2-30 l(2)(o). If government records are defined as public records under
GRAMA, access is not restricted. Utah Code Ann. §63-2-201(1). On the other hand, if
the requested records are properly classified by the governmental entity as private,
protected or controlled, access is restricted and permitted only pursuant to GRAMA. The
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County classified the records Young requested as "protected" and therefore contends that
Young is precluded from access. However, when the records Young requested are
analyzed under GRAMA, it is clear that the records are "public" and not "protected", as
Young argued in the district court.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-30l(2)(o) provides:
The following records are normally public, but to the extent that a record is expressly
exempt from disclosure, access may be restricted under Subsection 63-2-201 (3)(b),
Section 63-2-302, 63-2-303, or 63-2-304:
(o) records that would disclose information relating to formal charges or disciplinary
actions against a past or present governmental entity employee if: (i) the disciplinary
action has been completed and all time periods for administrative appeal have
expired; and (ii) the charges on which the disciplinary actions was based were
sustained.
Young requested copies of records of disciplinary investigations of any member of
the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department that involved either the improper use of a
firearm or inappropriate sexual misconduct, either physical or verbal. R. 76. The records
Young requested clearly fall within the records contemplated by subsection (o) of Utah
Code Ann. § 63-2-301(2). Further, Young made clear that he only needed the records for
comparison purposes and that only investigatory and disciplinary records of conduct
similar to his where the disciplinary proceedings were completed and the discipline was
imposed were needed. T. 3 and 7. Accordingly, the records Young was requesting also
satisfies the conditional requirements of subsection (o) that the appeal on any such
disciplinary actions had expired and the discipline was sustained.
Even though the records Young requested fit the public record definition of Utah
12

Code Ann. § 63-2-301(2), the statute nevertheless allows access to be restricted under
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-201(3)(b) and 63-2-204. The County has indeed sought to
prevent Young's access by invoking those statutes. However, the records Young
requested do not fit under those statutes thereby causing the records to remain public
subject to access.
The County argued that the records were "protected records" under Utah Code
Ann. § 63-2-304(9), (11) and (12). R. 96. The following records are protected if properly
classified under Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-304(9), (11) and (12):
(9)

records created or maintained for civil, criminal or administrative
enforcement purposes or audit purposes, or for discipline, licensing,
certification, or registration purposes, if release of the records:
a) reasonably could be expected to interfere with investigations, undertaken
for enforcement, discipline, licensing, certification, or registration purposes;
b) reasonably could be expected to interfere with audits, disciplinary, or
enforcement proceedings;
c) would create a danger of depriving a person of a right to a fair trial or
impartial hearing;
d) reasonably could be expected to disclose the identity of a source who is
not generally known outside of government and, in case of a record
complied in the course of an investigation, disclose information furnished
by a source not generally known outside government if disclosure would
compromise the source; or
e) reasonably could be expected to disclose investigative or audit
techniques, procedures, policies, or orders not generally known outside
government if disclosure would interfere with enforcement or audit efforts.

(11)

records the disclosure of which would jeopardize the security of
governmental property, governmental programs, or governmental recordkeeping systems from damage, theft, or other appropriation or use contrary
to law or public policy;

(12)

records that, if disclosed, would jeopardize the security or safety of a
correctional facility, or records relating to incarceration, treatment,
13

probation, or parole, that would interfere with the control and supervision
of an offender's incarceration, treatment, probation, or parole;
Clearly the records Young requested do not even arguably fall within subsections
(11) and (12). The records have nothing to do with governmental programs or property
or of a correctional facility. Subsection (9) is the only one that would even arguably
apply. However, an analysis of the requested records demonstrates that the County's
classification is incorrect.
First, the request sought records of disciplinary cases comparable to Young's
where the investigation and the discipline imposed have been adjudicated. Because the
request sought records on adjudicated cases, subsections (a) and (b) would not apply
because the matter would have been adjudicated and the disclosure thereof could not
reasonably be expected to interfere with disciplinary investigations or proceedings.
Second, subsection (c) of the statute would not apply for fundamentally the same reasons.
Because the request sought adjudicated records, the disclosure of the records could not
create a danger of depriving a person of a fair or impartial hearing or trial. Ironically, it is
the non-disclosure of the records that would create a danger of depriving Young a fair
hearing because he would be denied information relevant to his administrative
proceedings and necessary for his case.

Third, subsections (d) and (e) do not apply

simply because the concerns raised in those subsections do not exist in the records
requested. The request was for disciplinary records, not records on confidential

14

informants or techniques.1
The County's other contention that Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-20l(3)(b) applies by
virtue of the restriction on the records through Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19 is equally
without merit. Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19 does not apply to the records requested, and
even if it did, it certainly does not apply to all of the records. Utah Code Ann. § 17-1319 applies only to the Merit Commission and by its plain language only restricts release
of the "written charges" filed with the Merit Commission. Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19.
Young's request was filed with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department, not the Merit
Commission, and his request did not seek copies of the written charges filed with the
Merit Commission. Moreover, only certain major employment actions such as demotion,
reduction in pay, suspension or discharge require Merit Commission involvement. Utah
Code Ann. § 17-30-19. Thus, disciplinary investigations that did not result in any major
employment action would not even be covered by Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19. Indeed,
those are the records that would be most beneficial to Young. If the conduct investigated
was similar to Young's but did not result in major employment action, then the records
would be extremely probative because they would suggest that Young's major
employment action, dismissal, was not consistent or proportional.
The records Young requested are public records under GRAMA, specifically Utah

1

At the hearing before the district court the County made arguments to protect internal
affairs' files asserting that they are "protected" under Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-304(9). The
general basis for the County's arguments to restrict access have previously been considered and
rejected by this Court in Madsen v. United Television, Inc., 801 P.2d 912 (Utah 1990).
15

Code Ann. § 63-2-30l(2)(o). The County's argument that they are restricted records
because they classified them as protected records or because they are restricted under
Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19 is not persuasive because those statutes do not apply to the
records requested. Therefore, because the records Young requested are public records,
the district court properly ordered their release to Young.
III.
EVEN IF THE RECORDS WERE PROPERLY CLASSIFIED AS PROTECTED,
THE DISTRICT COURT COMPLIED WITH THE STATUTORY
REQUIREMENT TO ORDER THE RELEASE OF A PROTECTED RECORD.
The district court complied with Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-202(7) that provides a
court with authority to order the release of a protected record. The County argues that the
district court's order was improper, however, because it lacked jurisdiction and because
the court did not find proper authority to overcome the restriction of Utah Code Ann. §
17-30-19 on the release of the records. The County's arguments are contrary to the
codified intent of GRAMA, presents an unreasonable and unworkable interpretation of
GRAMA based on construction and policy grounds and misinterprets the application of
Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19.
A.

The district court had jurisdiction to order the release of the records.
Because the records Young requested are governmental records, the district court

had jurisdiction to consider his petition to review a GRAMA denial. However, the
County argues that GRAMA should be interpreted to read that the only way for a court to
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have jurisdiction to order the release of protected records is if the party requesting the
records also has a current action before the same court for which the records are needed.
If there is no underlying action before the same court, the County maintains that its
classification of a record as protected is absolute and access is precluded, period. See,
Appellant's brief, p. 15, ^f 3. The County therefore argues that because Young's
underlying action is before an administrative body and not the district court, the district
court had no jurisdiction to review his petition for judicial review and Young is therefore
precluded from accessing the records.
Unlike many statutes, GRAMA codified its legislative intent. Utah Code Ann. §
63-2-102. Its intent is clearly not to preclude access to restricted government records,
but rather to adopt a procedure to restrict access where appropriate to protect certain
interest by balancing the need for access against the need to restrict access to the records.
Id. See also, Graham v. Davis County Solid Waste Management, 979 P.2d 363, 371 (Ut.
App. 1999). Indeed, GRAMA specifically "favors public access when, in the application
of this act [GRAMA], countervailing interests are of equal weight." Utah Code Ann. §
63-1-102(e).
To achieve its intent, GRAMA provides sections that allow for the release of
protected records upon compliance with the statutory requirements. Utah Code Ann. §
63-2-202. Provided within that section is a subsection that provides for the release of
protected records upon court order. Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-202(7). Utah Code Ann. §
63-2-202(7) requires a governmental entity to release protected records pursuant to a
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court order provided the court has jurisdiction over the matter, considers the interests
favoring access against the interest to restrict access and finds the balance in favor of
access and, where access to the records are restricted elsewhere, the court has authority
independent of GRAMA to release the records. Id.
The district court's order complied with Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-202(7) in all
respects. The district court considered Young's need for access against the County's
interest in restricting access. T. 45 and 46. In considering the competing interest of the
parties, the court implicitly found that Young's interest in accessing the information
requested outweighed the County's interest in precluding access. R. 168. However,
consistent with Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-202(7), the court considered any privacy interest
that may be contained in the records and restricted access to any private information
contained therein by ordering the redaction of not only personal identities, but any
information that would lead to the discovery of identities. R. 169. Further, the court
provided for an in-camera review should disputes remain between the parties regarding a
particular record. R. 169.
The County argues, however, that the district court did not meet the jurisdictional
requirement under the first subsection of Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-202 and therefore it
could not even review their denial of Young's GRAMA request. The County appeals to
this Court to read Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-202(7)(a) which provides: "the record deals
with a matter in controversy over which the court has jurisdiction;" to mean that before a
court can order release of a protected or any other restricted record, the party requesting
18

record must have first filed an action for which the records are needed before the same
court. Because Young's need for the records is for his matter before the Merit
Commission and not before the district court, the County argues that the district court had
no jurisdiction to consider his petition for review. As a consequence, the County argues
that their classification of the records as "protected" not only restrict, but completely
precludes access.
Not only is the County's argument contrary to the intent of GRAMA and without a
basis in law, it is also an exceedingly myopic and unworkable approach to interpreting
GRAMA and would promote poor judicial policy. Under the County's argument the only
way a party could seek judicial review of their denial to a request for a protected record is
if the need for the protected record is for an action pending before the same court. The
County's approach would preclude parties in an action in federal court from petitioning
for judicial review of a denial of their request for state protected records since the federal
court would have no jurisdiction to review a denial of a request under state GRAMA.
The County's approach would preclude parties in need of information not for a legal
action but for other purposes from requesting judicial review of the denial. The County's
argument would promote poor judicial policy by forcing parties who are still evaluating
whether they have a viable cause of action to file an action prematurely just to obtain
records to determine whether they have a cause of action. Lastly, it would preclude
parties, like Young, from obtaining judicial review of a governmental entity's denial of a
GRAMA request made for records necessary in an administrative hearing. A review of
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Young's situation aptly demonstrates how unworkable the County's interpretation is.
One of two issues in Young's administrative hearing is whether the discipline
imposed upon him was warranted. Kelly v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Comm., 8 P.3d
1048, 1052 (Ut App. 2000). The issue presents the question of whether the discipline
was excessive or disproportionate. See, Lucas v. Murray City Civ. Serv. Comm fn, 949
P.2d 746 (Ut. App. 1997). In answering the question, Lucas demonstrates that the
inquiry involves a comparison to similar cases and the discipline imposed in those cases .
Id. at 762. Clearly, the issues facing Young require that he be provided with the records
he requested to develop his case because they are needed to demonstrate that his
discipline was not consistent or proportional in comparison to similar cases. In that
regard, GRAMA's intent to "prevent abuse of confidentiality by governmental entities by
permitting confidential treatment of records only as provided by this chapter (GRAMA);"
is completely consistent with providing Young access to the records he requested. Utah
Code Ann. § 63-2-102(3)(c). Despite the relevancy of the records Young requested, and
the legitimate basis for his request, the County's argument would preclude Young from
seeking the access to the records thereby denying him records clearly relevant and
material to his case.
Additionally, the County argues that Young's request is not ripe for judicial
review because he is still before the Merit Commission. That argument is equally
unworkable not only because it is a misapplication of the ripeness doctrine, but because it
also contemplates a "catch-22" situation. The ripeness doctrine concerns a judicial policy
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of not addressing issues which have not yet materialized to prevent the court from issuing
advisory opinions. See, State v. Ortiz, 987 P.2d 39 (Utah 1999). Given the issues facing
Young at his hearing, the issue and need for the records is ripe. The County's arguments
at the district court hearing suggest that they are confusing Young's due process interest
in acquiring the records with the "ripeness" of whether his due process rights would be
violated at the Merit Commission hearing. T. 23. Young has never asserted his due
process rights were violated. Rather, he asserted that he has a due process interest in
acquiring the records.

The County's argument, however, would first require Young to

go through the administrative proceeding without the benefit of the records before he can
petition for judicial review of the denial of his records request. But because any judicial
review of the administrative proceeding is limited to a "review of the record", even if
Young prevailed in gaining access to the records he requested during the review, the
administrative hearing will have already occurred mooting his request for the records.
See, Tolman v. Salt Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 26 (Ut. App. 1991). In essence,
the County argues that Young could not petition for judicial review of a GRAMA denial
before an administrative hearing because no court would have jurisdiction to hear the
petition, but the law says that if Young petitions for judicial review after the
administrative hearing the petition would be moot because the court's review would be
limited to the record of the administrative proceeding.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-202(7)(a) must be read in a manner consistent with its
plain meaning. What the statute clearly contemplates is that the requested records must
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be government records subject to GRAMA thereby "dealing with a matter in controversy
over which the court has jurisdiction." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-202(7)(a). Accepting the
County's argument, would preclude, not simply restrict access to government records by
preventing a party from even seeking judicial review of a governmental entity's decision
to restrict records. The County's argument is contrary to the intent, spirit and plain
meaning of GRAMA, and contrary to the specific objective of GRAMA to "prevent abuse
of confidentiality by governmental entities." Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-102(3)(c).
B.

Utah Code Ann. §17-30-19 does not apply to Young's request.
The County also argues that GRAMA under Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-102(7)(e)

requires a court to find authority independent of GRAMA where another statute restrict
the release of the requested records. The County again relies upon Utah Code Ann. § 1730-19 as the other statute that it maintains restricts the requested records to argue the
district court must therefore find authority independent of GRAMA to order the release.
The County ultimately contends that the district court's order was in error because its
reliance on Young's due process right to the records was insufficient and that the statute
requires independent "statutory authority" to order the release. Appellant's brief, p. 20,
^ 1. Beyond the fact that the statute's language does not support the County's argument
that independent "statutory" must exist to order release, the County's argument is without
merit because Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19 does not apply to the records requested, and
even if it does apply, it would not apply to all the records. Finally, even if it applies to all
the records requested, the district court found proper authority independent of GRAMA
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to order release.
Young requested records from the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department
"concerning any investigation of any sworn member of the Salt Lake County Sheriffs
Department where the conduct investigated concerned the inappropriate use or handling
of a firearm or inappropriate sexual conduct, both verbal or physical." R. 167. The
County seeks to manipulate the records requested to mean that the requested records are
records filed with the Merit Commission. Their objective is obvious. By so manipulating
the request, they are able to invoke Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19 restriction on the release
of the records. As previously argued, however, the records Young requested do not fall
under Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19.
First, Young's request was to the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department, not the
Merit Commission. Second, the request was for records concerning the investigation of
any sworn member of the Department. The request was not limited to the "written
charges" filed with the Merit Commission which are the only records covered by the
plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19. Thus, Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19 does
not apply to the records Young requested.
The application of Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19 is also limited. Only written
charges resulting in demotion, reduction in pay, suspension, or discharge are restricted
under Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19(1). Disciplinary investigations where the discipline
imposed did not involve any of the four above disciplines would not be subject to Utah
Code Ann. § 17-30-19. Accordingly, even if Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19 applies, it
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would not apply to any cases involving conduct similar to which Young was charged
where the discipline did not meet the statutory requirement.
Assuming, however, that Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19 does apply in whole, the
district court properly applied Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-202(7)(e). The district court found
that Young had a due process right to the requested records, but with restrictions on the
private information contained therein, reasoning that Young was entitled to the records to
assist in his appeal before the Merit Commission. The district court's reasoning is well
founded.
Since Young was a merit employee with the County, his termination was subject
to appeal before the Merit Commission. Utah Code Ann. § 17-30-19. While Young's
post-termination proceedings before the Merit Commission are not based on a
"constitutional guarantee", the proceedings must nevertheless "comport with due process
requirements providing for a fair hearing." Lucas v. Murray Civil Serv. Comm yn, 949
P.2d 746, 753 (Ut. App. 1997). There are two issues before the Merit Commission in
reviewing the County's discipline of Young. Id. The second of the two issues concerns
the proportionality of the discipline imposed on Young. Id. at 758. It requires a
consideration of the consistency of the discipline which is evaluated by, among other
factors, comparing the discipline to that imposed on other employees for similar conduct.2

2

The Salt Lake County Sheriffs Department maintains a policy similar to, if not exact
like, the policy examined in Lucas v. Murray Civil Serv. Comm % 949 P.2d 746 (Ut. App. 1997).
R. 150.
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Id. at 762. The records Young requested concerned the discipline imposed on other
deputies for similar conduct which he clearly needs to fairly address the second issue and
develop his case. Without the records Young would be precluded from challenging his
discipline and would allow the County to maintain a secrecy of the evidence that may be
relevant to the consistency of the discipline they imposed. At a minimum, denying
Young access to the relevant records he requested fails to comport with due process
requirements, and would create the "appearance of unfairness" from which a reasonable
person would find the hearing unfair; which due process does not tolerate. Tolman v. Salt
Lake County Attorney, 818 P.2d 23, 28 (Ut. App. 1991).
Moreover, under the recent case ofKelly v. Salt Lake Civil Serv. Co mm 'n, 8. P.3d
1048 (Ut. App. 2000) Young will have the specific burden of demonstrating the disparity
of his discipline by comparing it to similarly situated employees.3 Id. at 1056. In meeting
his burden, Young must "point to specific instances or statistics, rather than relying on an
unsupported assertion of inconsistent punishments." Id. With that burden, Young must
have access to the records of "similarly situated employees" to present his case. Denying
Young the records, which are exclusively within the control of the County, would prevent
Young from even being able to present a case and assure his defeat before the hearing
even starts. That would render the entire hearing process meaningless thereby running

3

As in Lucas, the decision in Kelly v. Salt Lake Civil Serv. Comm 'n, 8. P.3d 1048 (Ut.
App. 1997) relies upon a department policy similar to that which will be applicable in Young's
Merit Commission proceedings. R. 150.
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afoul of due process. The district court's reliance on due process principles as the
authority to order the disclosure of the records Young requested is therefore sound and
provided competent authority independent GRAMA to order the County to comply with
Young's requests.
Even if the County properly classified the records as protected, the district court
properly complied with GRAMA in ordering the release of the records. The court
properly had jurisdiction, considered the competing interest in the records and protected
any private information in ordering the release and the court found competent
independent authority to order the release to the extent the records were restricted by
another statute.
IV.
YOUNG SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEYS FEES
BECAUSE THE COUNTY'S APPEAL IS WITHOUT MERIT.
Under Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33(a), this Court may assess damages for
appeals that are frivolous or taken for delay. U.R.App.P 33(a). A frivolous appeal is an
appeal "that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a
good faith argument to extend, modify, or reverse existing law." U.R.App.P. 33(b).
The County's appeal is frivolous for two fundamental reasons: 1) the arguments
that they present are contrary to the plain language of the statutes upon which they rely
and 2) their arguments interpreting the statutes are contrary to the intent of the statutes
therefore not warranted by existing law or based on a good faith argument to extend,
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modify or reverse existing law.
Moreover, the fundamental concern the County has always maintained in releasing
the records is the "private nature" of the records, noting the personal private information
that the records may contain. T. 18,19,22,23. The summary judgment order, however,
redacted any personal information and Young was never requesting any personal
information. Nevertheless the County filed the appeal and continues to maintain their
concern over the release of personal information. Appellant's brief, p.21. The County's
continued concern despite it being adequately addressed in the order raises concern over
the County's interest in the delay caused by the appeal. The delay would certainly work
to the County's benefit on many levels including the cost of litigation for Young, a
former governmental employee. Because the summary judgment order addressed the
County's concerns, their interest in pursuing this appeal warrants a finding that it is being
taken for delay giving reason for the assessment of damages.
Accordingly, Young respectfully requests that he be awarded damages against the
County for pursuing this appeal because it was frivolous and pursued to cause delay.
CONCLUSION
Young requested records from the County that was limited to only those records
he needed to develop his case in an administrative proceeding. The records he requested
are public records by statutory definition. The County's argument to the contrary is not
supported by the statute. Assuming, however, that the records requested are protected
records, the district court properly complied with the statutory requirement necessary for
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the release of protected records. Based upon the foregoing, Young respectfully requests
that this Court affirm the summary judgment order of the district court, and award
damages to Young against the County.
DATED this ^ A (

day of September, 2001.

$AKAmSKY& NYKAMP

B r a k e d Makamura
Attorney fw Plaintiff/Appellee
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BLAKE NAKAMURA, USB #6288
NAKAMURA &' NYKAMP
Attorneys for Appellant
142 East 200 South, Suite 312
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)530-1541
SALT LAKE COUNTY
DEPUTY SHERIFF'S MERIT SERVICE COMMISSION
ooOoo
BRENT YOUNG,
Appellant,
vs.

)
)
)

RESPONSE TO DECISION ON
IN CAMERA REVIEW OF
COMPARABLE CASES

)

SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S
DEPARTMENT
Respondent.

)
)

No. 00-1

)
ooOoo

COMES now the Appellant, Brent Young, by and through his
counsel, Blake Nakamura, and hereby responds to the Commission's
decision to not release copies of any disciplinary cases to Mr.
Young.

Mr. Young responds by providing several cases for the

Commission's review to determine if they were disclosed by the
Respondent.

Mr. Young so responds because his own investigation

has revealed casesr

some of which are clearly similar to the

conduct charged in Mr. Young's case and, therefore, should have
been disclosed.

Because the Commission's review relied solely

upon the disclosure by the Respondent, Mr. Young provides the
Commission the following cases for further review to ensure the
thoroughness of the Respondent's disclosures.

1

For the purpose of comparison, Mr. Young was disciplined for
exercising poor judgement in his choice of words that he used in
communicating wirh an 8 year old female and used the words in a
u

quid pro quo" phrase.

Mr. Young was nor disciplined for acting

with any ill intent. Based upon those grounds for Mr. Young's
discipline, the following cases are identified for further
comparison:
1.

Deputy Mike Kimball
Deputy Kimball was an instructor at Judge Memorial High

School.

In that capacity, Deputy Kimball developed an intimate

relationship with a female student.

The relationship was

apparently discovered and reported to the Department.

Deputy

Kimball was investigated for misconduct and given minor
discipline.

After being disciplined, and contrary to his

discipline, Deputy Kimball resumed the relationship with the
female student.

The relationship was again disclosed and Deputy

Kimball was again disciplined.
demonstrate poor judgement.

The actions of Deputy Kimball

However, despite even being

discipline previously, Deputy Kimball was not terminated and
continues tc be employed as a Deputy Sheriff.
2.

Mark Neilson or Nelson:
Deputy Neilson was a high school resource officer.

In that

capacity, he developed an intimate relationship with a female
student.

To conceal the relationship, Deputy Neilson apparently

2

solicited Deputy Lonnie Wilson to purchase gifts on his behalf
for the female student.

The relationship was disclosed and

Deputy Neilson was disciplined.
demonstrate poor judgement.

The actions of Deputy Meilson

Deputy Neilson, however, continues

to be employed as a Deputy Sheriff.
3.

Sergeant Bob Petersen:
In early 2000, it is understood that an allegation of some

form of child abuse was reported against Sergeant Petersen.
child was apparently a grandchild.

The

The matter was investigated

and Sergeant Petersen was placed on administrative leave.

It is

unknown what discipline he received.
4.

Deputy Sampson:
It is believed that Deputy Sampson is now a Lieutenant.

When he was a Sergeant, he apparently developed an intimate
.relationship with a female subordinate.

The relationship was

apparently determined to be inappropriate by the Department and
Sampson was disciplined.

It is believed that Sampson received 30

days off without pay as his discipline.

The actions of Sergeant

Sampson demonstrates poor judgement, however, he remains employed
and even apparently received a promotion to Lieutenant.
In the event, the above cases

were disclosed to the

Commission for review, Mr. Young alternatively moves the
Commission to reconsider whether the conduct described in cases
provided by the Respondent are similar to the conduct alleged

against Mr. Young and, therefore, meriting disclosure.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

^

day of August 2001

Blake Nakamura
Attorney forNAppellant,

4

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
—oooOooo—
In re:
DMG COLOR, INC.,

Bankruptcy No. 94A-23721
(Chapter 7)
Debtor(s).
—oooOooo—

TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR ORDER
APPROVING SALE OF PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
Roger G. Segal, Chapter 7 Trustee of the bankruptcy estate of the above named debtor
pursuant to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. §363(b) and Rule 6004 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure moves the Court for an order authorizing and approving the sale of certain personal
property of the estate. In support of said Motion, the Trustee represents to the Court as follows:
1.

The Debtor filed a Voluntary Petition under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code on

July 27, 1994. Said case was converted to a case under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code on
November 30,1995. Roger G. Segal was appointed as permanent Trustee of the Debtor's estate
on January 16,1996.
2.

Included in the bankruptcy estate of the above named Debtor are claims and

potential causes of action, including but not limited to claims against Dick Warner, a former principal
of the Debtor, for alleged misappropriation of the Debtor's business, goodwill and customer base.

3.

The Trustee has received an offer from Rick H. Warner to purchase the claims and

potential causes of action of the Debtor from the Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate of DMG Color, Inc.
("the property") for the sum of $2,000.00. The sale is subject to Bankruptcy Court approval, subject
to higher and better offers.
4.

The Trustee makes no representation as to the value or legal sufficiency of any such

claims or potential causes of action. The Trustee has determined that it is in the best interest of the
estate and its creditors to sell the property to Rick H. Warner rather than to pursue those claims
himself on behalf of the estate. In the event the Trustee is unable to sell the property, he intends
to abandon the estate's interest in the property as burdensome to the estate. In the opinion of the
Trustee the value of the property to the estate is not sufficient, after considering Chapter 7
administrative costs and unpaid Chapter 11 administrative expenses, to produce a benefit to
unsecured creditors if pursued through litigation by the Trustee.
5.

Persons desiring to submit higher and better offers should do so by submitting them

in writing to the Trustee's counsel, John T. Morgan of Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C., 525 East
First South, Fifth Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 to be actually received by no later than
Wednesday, January 7,1998. Offers must be free of contingency, must provide for payment of not
less than $2,500.00, and shall otherwise be on the same terms as the Trustee's proposed sale to
Rick Warner or on terms which, in the Trustee's sole opinion, are more favorable to the Debtor's
estate. Offers must provide for a closing within twenty four (24) hours of the Bankruptcy Court
approval of the Motion.
6.

In the event that competing offers for the property are received, the Trustee shall

arrange for an auction sale to be held among Rick H. Warner and any competing offeror who has
submitted an offer in accordance with paragraph 5 with not less than twenty four (24) hours notice
of the time and place of the auction sale. The opening bid at the auction sale shall be $200.00
higher than the highest offer submitted for the property and the Trustee will accept bids in
increments of not less than $100.00 until the highest bid is received. At the time of the hearing

before the Bankruptcy Court on this Motion, the Trustee will advise the Court with respect to the
highest offer which he has received and will request that the sale of the property to the offeror who
has made the highest and best offer be approved. The Trustee may in his sole discretion accept
a backup offer, and seek Court approval for, the second highest bid submitted for the property. In
the event that the highest bidder fails to close the purchase of the property in a timely manner, the
Trustee may sell the property pursuant to the backup offer.
WHEREFORE the Trustee prays that the Court enter an Order providing as follows:
1.

Approving the sale of the property to Rick H. Warner pursuant to the terms set forth

herein, or to the person who has submitted the highest and best offer pursuant to the terms of
paragraphs 5 and 6; and,
2.

Authorizing the Trustee to take all steps necessary to complete and close the sale

of the property; and
3.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems appropriate under the

circumstances.
DATED this

day of December, 1997.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.

^John T. Morgan
Attorneys for the Trustee

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the

ay of December, 1997 a true and

accurate copy of the foregoing document was mailed, first class, postage fully prepaid, in the United
States mail, to all creditors listed on the official mailing matrix, attached hereto, and specifically to:
United States Trustee
Suite 100, Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
DMG Color, Inc.
3473 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Rick H. Warner
c/o James G. Swensen
Corbridge, Baird & Christensen
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Dick Warner and Vickie Lynn Warner
1657 East Haven Glen Lane
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Steven W. Call
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker
79 South Main, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
J. Randall Call
Sally B. McMinimee
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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John T. Morgan, Bar No. 3839
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C
525 East 100 South, Suite 500
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorneys for the Chapter 7 Trustee

DOCKEr
CONTROL

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
—oooOooo—
In re:
DMG COLOR, INC.,

Bankruptcy No. 94A-23721
(Chapter 7)
Debtor(s).
—oooOooo—

NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S INTENT TO SELL PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
AND
NOTICE OF HEARING ON TRUSTEE'S MOTION FOR ORDER APPROVING
SALE OF PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
TO ALL CREDITORS OF THE DEBTORS AND OTHER PARTIES IN INTEREST APPEARING ON
THE DEBTOR'S MAILING MATRIX:
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that pursuant to Rules 2002 and 6004 of the Federal Rules of
Bankruptcy Procedure, Roger G. Segal the duly appointed, qualified and acting Chapter 7 Trustee
of the above captioned bankruptcy estate hereby gives notice that he intends to sell the bankruptcy
estate's right, title and interest in certain personal property (hereinafter "the property") consisting of
claims and potential causes of action of the Debtor for alleged.
Notice of Trustee's Intent to Sell Personal Property of the Estate
and Notice of Hearing
Page 1

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the /b

day of December, 1997 a true a

accurate copy of the foregoing document was mailed, first class, postage fully prepaid, in the Unit
States mail, to all creditors listed on the official mailing matrix, attached hereto, and specifically i
United States Trustee
Suite 100, Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
DMG Color, Inc.
3473 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
Rick H. Warner
c/o James G Swensen
Corbridge, Baird & Chnstensen
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Dick Warner and Vickie Lynn Warner
1657 East Haven Glen Lane
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Steven W. Call
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker
79 South Main, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
J. Randall Call
Sally B. McMinimee
Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

_
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Notice of Trustee's Intent to Sell Personal Property of the Estate
and Notice of Hearing
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PREPARED AND SUBMITTED BY:

/

W
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John T. Morgan, Esq.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
P.O. Box 11008
525 East 100 South, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
Telephone: (801) 532-2666
Attorneys for Chapter 7 Trustee
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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
—oooOooo—
In re:
Bankruptcy No. 94A-23721
(Chapter 7)

DMG COLOR, INC.,
Debtor(s).
—oooOooo—

ORDER AUTHORIZING SALE OF PERSONAL PROPERTY
A hearing was held on January 12, 1998 concerning the Trustee's Motion for Order Approving Sale
of Property of the Estate. John T. Morgan of the law firm of Cohne, Rappaport & Segal, P.C. appeared on
behalf of the Trustee, Roger G. Segal, and other appearances, if any, were noted on the record.
At the hearing, counsel for the Trustee advised the Court that an auction sale was held January 7,1998
between Rick H. Warner and Dick Warner, the two individuals who had presented competing offers to the
Trustee for the property. At the auction the highest bid was received from Dick Warner and his bid of
$4,500.00 was accepted by the Trustee pursuant to the terms of the Trustee's Motion and subject to the approval
of the Court.
Based upon the finding that notice of the intended sale was properly given to all creditors and parties
in interest and upon the failure of any party in interest to appear or otherwise object to the sale, and the Court
having found that the proposed sale is in the best interest of the estate and its creditors and for good cause

Order Authorizing Sale of Personal Property
January 12,1998
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shown, now, therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Trustee is authorized to sell the claims and potential causes of
action of the Debtorfromthe Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate of DMG Color, Inc. without warranty (the "property")
to Dick Warner for the sum of $4,500.00 pursuant to the terms set forth in the Motion dated December 18,
1997; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Trustee is authorized to take all steps necessary to complete
and close the sale of the property; and,
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Trustee is authorized to close the sale of the property pursuant
to the backup offer in the event Dick Warner fails to close the purchase as required under the terms of the
Trustee's Motion.
DATED this / < * day of January, 1998.

^J^/&^^
JohMI. Allen
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the l^xday of January, 1998 a true and accurate copy of
the foregoing Order was mailed, first class, postage fully prepaid, in the United States Mail, to:
Roger G. Segal, Trustee
P. O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
John T. Morgan, Esq.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.
Attorneys for Trustee
P. O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008
United States Trustee
Suite 100, Boston Building
9 Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Steven W. Call
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker
79 South Main, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Rick H. Warner
c/o James G. Swenson
Corbridge, Baird & Christensen
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
v
0*0
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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH

NO. 94 - 23721 JHA
Chapter 7

IN RE
DMG Color, Inc.
Debtor(s).

MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL:
John T. Morgan (Trustee)

Proceedings were held on January 12, 1998.

DOCKET ENTRY:
Minute Entry Re: [83-1] Notice of Intent to Sell by Roger G. Segal. (JHA;HH;KM; 3 min)
$4,500 sale to Dick Warner approved if time limit is complied with; otherwise, backup offer is
approved. Order executed.

BILL OF SALE
KNOW ALL PEOPLE BY THIS BILL OF SALE that Roger G. Segal, Trustee of the
Bankruptcy Estate of DMG Color, Inc., Debtor, Bankruptcy No. 94A-23721 (hereinafter referred
to as the "Seller"), pursuant to an Order of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Utah entered January 13,1998, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A", for the sum of
Four Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($4,500.00) and other good and valuable consideration, the
receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, has bargained, sold, assignedand
transferred and by this Bill of Sale does hereby sell, assign and transfer unto Digital Media Group
all of the bankruptcy estate's interest in claims and potential causes of action of the Debtor,
including but not limited to claims against Dick Warner for alleged misappropriation of the
Debtor's business, goodwill and customer base.
Seller makes no warranty express or implied regarding the legal status or condition of the
property interest transferred pursuant to this Bill of Sale.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the seller has executed this Bill of Sale this $0] day of
January, 1998.

Roger\G\SeEaL
Trusteewthib^ankruptcy Estate of
DMG Color, Inc.

James G. Swensen. Jr., USB No. 3874
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 534-0909
Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICK H. WARNER, ari individual,
FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT
Plaintiff,
Civil No 982170702
v.
Judge Atherton
DMG COLOR, INC., a Utah corporation,
DICK M G. WARNER, an individual,
VICKI LYNN WARNER, an individual,
DIGITAL MEDIA GROUP, L C, a limited
liability company, and
DOES number 1 through 9,
Defendants.

Plaintiff, Rick H. Wamer ("PlaintifF'), causes this verified Complaint to be filed by and
through his attorney, James G. Swensen, Jr., and alleges the following as his Complaint against
Defendants:
1. Jurisdiction in this Court is invoked pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-3-4 (1953).
2. Plaintiff is an individual residing at 3015 Middleton Way, Salt Lake City, Utah 84124.

3. Defendant, DMG Color, Inc., is a Utah corporation with its last registered address at 6:
South 2475 East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84121.
4. Defendant Dick M. G. Warner is an individual residing at 1657 East Haven Glen Lane, S
Lake City, Utah 84121.
5. Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner is an individual residing at 1657 East Haven Glen Lane, S
Lake City, Utah 84121.
6. Digital Media Group, L.C. is Utah limited liability company with a registered address
1843 West 2770 South, Suite 70, Salt Lake City, Utah 84119,

GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
7. On or about May 24, 1991, Defendant Dick M. G. Wamer, as a director and sharehotde
of Defendant DMG Color, Inc., signed a Directors1 and Shareholders1 Consent Resolution authorizin
Defendant DMG Color, Inc. to redeem all of its shares of capital stock owned by Plaintiff for casl
and an Installment Note (the "Installment Note*,)l and pursuant thereto Defendant DMG Color, Inc
contracted to redeem all of it shares of capital stock owned by Plaintiff.
8. Since May 24, 1991 and at all times material to this action, Defendant Dick M G Warnei
or Defendant Dick M. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Wamer have been and are the sole
voting shareholder(s) of Defendant DMG Color, Inc.
9. A complete unity of interest and ownership exists among Defendant DMG Color, Inc.,
Defendant Dick M, G, Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Wamer such that their separate
personalities no longer exist and Defendant DMG Color, Inc. is in fact the alter ego of Defendant
Dick M. G. Wamer and Defendant Vicki Lynn Wamer.
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10. To observe the separate existence of Defendant DMG Color, Inc. would sanction a fraud,
promote injustice, or an inequitable result would follow.
11. Defendant Dick M. G. Warner caused Defendant DMG Color, Inc. to default on its
payment of the Installment Note to Plaintiff and Plaintiff brought suit to collect the Installment Note
in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah, Civil No. 920902482.
12 On or about June 25, 1993, the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah,
entered its Order and Judgment, Civil No 920902482, in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant
DMG Color, Inc. in the amount of $200,588.51 plus interest and costs (thec< Judgment"). A copy
of the Order and Judgment is attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by this
reference.
13 On or about February 28, 1994, the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County,
Utah entered its Order, Civil No. 920902482, awarding Plaintiff all of therightsof a shareholder in
Defendant DMG Color, Inc., except votingrights,until the Installment Note has been paid in full.
A copy of the Order is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated herein by this reference.
14. On or about July 19, 1994, Plaintiff caused Writs of Garnishment to be served on certain
financial institutions used by and customers of Defendant DMG Color, Inc. in an effort to collect
Plaintiffs Judgment against Defendant DMG Color, Inc.
15. On or about July 27,1994, Defendant DMG Color, Inc.fileda petition for reorganization
under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, In Re: DMG Color, Inc. Case No. 94-23721, with the
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah.
16. On or about April 3, 1995, Defendant Digital Media Group, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company with an address at 1842 West 2770 South, Suite 70, Salt Lake City, Utah 84119, was
3

formed by Defendant Dick M. G Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner, and Defendant I
M. G Warner and/or Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner have since the formation of Defendant Dig
Media Group, L C. and at all times material to this action been the sole members and managers
Defendant Digital Media Group, L.C
17. A complete unity of interest and ownership exists among Defendant Digital Media Groi
L C , Defendant Dick M. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner such that their separ<
personalities no longer exist and Defendant Digital Media Group, L.C. is in fact the alter ego
Defendant Dick M. G Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Wamer.
18. To observe the separate existence of Defendant Digital Media Group, L.C wou
sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an inequitable result would follow
19. On or about November 30, 1995, the United States Bankruptcy Court, In Re* DM
Color, Inc Case No 94-23721, entered its Order Converting Chapter 11 Case to Chapter 7
20 On or about December 19, 1997, the Bankruptcy Trustee, In Re: DMG Color, Inc Cas
No. 94-23721, filed his Motion for Order Approving Sale of Property of the Estate, stating his mten
to sell the property, including claims and potential causes of action, or if unable to sell, his intent U
abandon the estate's interest in the property as burdensome to the estate.
21, On or about January 12, 1998, the Bankruptcy Court entered its Order Authorizing Salt
of Personal Property to Defendant Dick M G Warner,
22. On or about March 13, 1998, Plaintiff caused to be delivered to the Bankruptcy Trustee,
counsel for the Bankruptcy Trustee, Defendant Dick M. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn
Warner a demand for action on behalf of the Defendant DMG Color, Inc. in respect of claims made
in this Complaint. No action has been taken in response to Plaintiffs demand and it is unlikely that
4

any action will be taken inasmuch as Defendant Dick M. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn
Warner are likely defendants of any such action and they claim to control the acts of Defendant
DMG Color, Inc. and Defendant Digital Media Group, L.C.
23. Plaintiff is a shareholder and creditor of Defendant DMG Color, Inc., is the sole
shareholder and creditor of Defendant DMG Color, Inc. similarly situated, and this action is not a
collusive one to confer jurisdiction on a court of the United States which it would not otherwise have.
24. Defendants transferred or caused to be transferred assets of Defendant DMG Color, Inc ,
including, but not by way of limitation, customer accounts, sales, employee relationships, business
opportunities, going concern value, and goodwill (the "Assets") for their own personal use and
benefit.
FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF - CONVERSION
25. Plaintiff reincorporates by reference and realleges all preceding allegations of this
Complaint for himself and on behalf of DMG Color, Inc.
26. Defendant Dick M G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner converted Assets of
Defendant DMG Color, Inc. by transferring or causing to be transferred to themselves, to Defendant
Digital Media Group, L.C. and to others, Assets of Defendant DMG Color, Inc.
27. Defendant Dick M. G, Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner exercised dominion
or control over Assets of DMG Color, Inc., the true owner.
28. Defendant Dick M. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner acted wrongfully and
maliciously and knowingly converted Assets of DMG Color, Inc. to their own use and benefit and
the use and benefit of Digital Media Group, Inc.
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SECOND CLAIM FOR RELIEF - WRONGFUL
APPROPRIATION OF BUSINESS OPPORTUNITY
29. Plaintiff reincorporates by reference and realleges all preceding allegations of tl
Complaint for himself and on behalf of Defendant DMG Color, Inc.
30. Defendant Dick M. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner misappropriat<
business opportunities and Assets of Defendant DMG Color, Inc. to themselves and to others fi
their own personal use and benefit and aided and abetted the misappropriation of busine
opportunities and Assets of Defendant DMG Color, Inc. to themselves and to others for their ow
personal use and benefit, all to the detriment and damage of Plaintiff and Defendant DMG Color, Inc
31. Defendant Dick M. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner, while officer*
affiliates, insiders, control persons and fiduciaries of Defendant DMG Color, Inc., negligently
carelessly, recklessly and intentionally failed to perform their duties so that Assets of Defendant DMC
Color, Inc. were mismanaged, wasted, diverted and siphoned off to Defendant Digital Media Group
L.C., Defendant DickM. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner, and Plaintiff and Defendant
DMG Color, Inc. thereby suffered great loss because of such mismanagement, waste, diversion and
siphoning.
32. Defendant Dick M G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner, while officers,
affiliates, insiders, control persons and fiduciaries of Defendant DMG Color, Inc., negligently,
carelessly, recklessly and intentionally failed to perform their duties in that: (a) they did not
adequately supervise the affairs of DMG Color, Inc.; (b) they permitted and caused Assets to be
diverted to their own use and benefit and to Defendant Digital Media Group, L.C. for their own use
and benefit; (c) they permitted and caused to paid excessive amounts of compensation to themselves
6

by Defendant DMG Color, Inc. and by Defendant Digital Media Group, L.C ; (d) they, individually
and through Defendant Digital Media Group, L.C., and Digital Media Group, L.C were unjustly
enriched.
THIRD CLAIM FOR RELIEF- FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE
33. Plaintiff reincorporates by reference and realleges all preceding allegations of this
Complaint for himself and on behalf of Defendant DMG Color, Inc.
34. Defendant Dick M. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner fraudulently transferred
and conveyed Assets of Defendant DMG Color, Inc. to themselves and to others for their own
personal use and benefit and aided and abetted the fraudulent conveyance of Assets of Defendant
DMG Color, Inc. to themselves and to others for their own personal use and benefit, all to the
detriment and damage of Plaintiff and DMG Color, Inc.
35. Defendant Dick M. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner violated Utah Code
Ann. §25-6-5(l)(a) (1953) in that they transferred or caused to be transferred to themselves, to
Defendant Digital Media Group, L.C. and to others, as affiliates and insiders, Assets with actual intent
to hinder, delay or defraud Plaintiff and Defendant DMG Color, Inc.
36. Defendant Dick M. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner violated Utah Code
Ann. §25-6-5(1 )(b) (1953) in that they transferred or caused to be transferred to themselves, to
Defendant Digital Media Group, L.C. and to others, as affiliates and insiders, Assets without
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer and Defendant DMG Color, Inc.
was engaged in a business for which remaining assets were unreasonably small.
37. Defendant Dick M. G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner violated Utah Code
Ann. §25-6-6(1) (1953) in that they transferred or caused to be transferred to themselves, to
7

Defendant Digital Media Group, L C and to others, as affiliates and insiders, Assets with
receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer and Defendant DMG Color, I
was insolvent or became insolvent as a result of the transfer.
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as follows:
38. That judgment be awarded in favor of Plaintiff and Defendant DMG Color, Inc. igair
Defendants, jointly and severally, in the amount of the fair market value of the Assets transferred I
or on behalf of Defendants
39

That judgment be awarded in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants, jointly ar

severally, for exemplary damages in the amount of $525,000 00 for Defendants' willful, wrongful an
malicious acts
40 That the amount of the unjust enrichment of Defendants Dick M G Warner, Vicki Lyn
Warner and Digital Media Group, L.C. be ascertained and determined and that judgment be awarde<
in favor of Plaintiff and DMG Color, Inc. against Defendants, jointly and severally, in that amount
41

That the amount of the loss sustained by Defendant DMG Color, Inc. by reason of th<

fraudulent acts of Defendant Dick M. G. Warner, Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner and Defendani
Digital Media Group, L.C be ascertained and determined and that judgment be awarded in favor o\
Plaintiff and Defendant DMG Color, Inc. against Defendants, jointly and severally, in that amount.
42. That the Court award to Plaintiff his actual damages in the amount of his Judgment and
costs of collection.
43. That the Court award to Plaintiff an equitable remedy of alter ego and hold Defendant
Dick M, G. Warner and Defendant Vicki Lynn Warner personally liable for the debts and obligations
8

of Defendant Digital Media Group, L.C. to Defendant .DMG Color, Inc. and to Plaintiff and for the
debts and obligations of Defendant DMG Color, Inc. to Plaintiff.
44. That the Court award to Plaintiff interest, costs and expenses, including reasonable
attorney's fees, and such general relief as the Court deems appropriate.
DATED this /I

day of November, 1998.

RickH.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
)ss:
STATE OF UTAH
)

•A

On the Lljaay of November, 1998, personally appeared before me Rick H. Warner,
the signer of the within and foregoing Complaint, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed
the same.

My Commission expires:

NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing in:

Plaintiffs Address:
3015 Middleton Way
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124
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COMMISSION EXPi^SS
OCT, 23. *Oi>2
SlATC.Of UTAH

G Swensen, Jr., 39 Exchange Place, Suite 100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, a copy of your Ans
within twenty (20) days after service of this Summons upon you.
If you fail to so answer, judgement by default will be taken against you for the re
demanded in the Complaint.
DATED this / I * day of November, 1998.

lames G. Swensen, Jr.
Attorney for Plaintiff
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Prepared and submitted by:

HERSCHEL J. SAPESTEIN (A2861)
STEVEN W. CALL (A5260)
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801)532-1500
Attorneys for Defendants D. M. G. Warner,
Vicki Lynn Warner and Digital Media
Group, L.C.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICK H. WARNER, an individual,
Plaintiff,

v.

[Revised]
JUDGMENT
DISMISSING CASE
Civil No. 982170702

DMG COLOR, INC., a Utah corporation,
DICK M.G. WARNER, an individual, VICKI
LYNN WARNER, an individual, DIGITAL
MEDIA GROUP, L.C, a limited liability
company, and DOES number 1 through 9,

Hon. Judith S. H. Atherton

Defendants.

An action was commenced by Rick H. Wamer, the plaintiff in the above-captioned case,
against the above-named Defendants. In response thereto, Defendants Dick M.G. Warner, Vicki
Lynn Warner, Digital Media Group, L.C. (collectively hereinafter "Defendants") moved the

Court to dismiss the claims filed against them for cause, and to award reasonable attorney's fees
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. The Motion to Dismiss was supported by a
Memorandum of Points and Authorities and a Reply Memorandum that was filed in response to
plaintiffs opposition memorandum.
The Court having considered the Motion to Dismiss, the Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support thereof, the Order of the United States Bankruptcy Court, the Affidavit of
Dick Warner, Defendants' Reply Memorandum and the opposition memorandum filed by the
Plaintiff, hereby makes its determination of undisputed facts, conclusions of law and order of
judgment as follows:
DETERMINATION OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case pursuant to Utah Code

Ann. § 78-3-4. Venue is proper before this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-6 & 7.
2.

The Court has personal jurisdiction over the parties to this action, except for

D.M.G. Color, Inc., based upon the appearances or record and/or the pleadings on file in the
case.
3-

D.M.G. Color, Inc. ("D.M.G.") filed in the United States Bankruptcy Court for

the Distirict of Utah (the "Bankruptcy Court") its voluntary petition for relief under Chapter 11 of
the United States Bankruptcy Code on July 27, 1994.
4.

The Chapter 11 case was converted to a case under Chapter 7 on November 30,

1995, and Roger Segal was appointed the permanent trustee in that case on January 16,1996.
5.

Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 541, the Chapter 7 in bankruptcy estate was comprised of

all property owned by D.M.G., including all causes of action and claims of D.M.G., and the

United States Bankruptcy Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction over all such property of
D.M.G. pursuant to §§ 28 U.S.C. 1334(e) and 157(a).
6.

On December 19,1997, Roger Segal, as trustee, filed his motion for approval of

the sale of all claims of D.M.G. if any (including but not limited to any alleged claims against
Defendant Dick Warner) to the plaintiff or to the highest bidder at an auction sale to be
conducted by the bankruptcy trustee. Certified copies of the trustee's motion for order approving
the sale of those claims and the notice of hearing thereon are attached as Exhibits "A" and "B" to
Defendants' Opening Memorandum.
7.

After a hearing was held by the Bankruptcy Court on January 12, 1998, the

Bankruptcy Court made and entered its order dated January 13, 1998 authorizing the bankruptcy
trustee to sell the claims, and potential causes of action, of D.M.G. to Defendant Dick Warner,
who was the highest bidder at the sale.
8.

A copy of the Bankruptcy Court's Order approving the sale was served on the

plaintiff. A certified copy of the Order, which includes the certificate of service, is attached as
Exhibit C to Defendants' Opening Memorandum.
9.

Pursuant to the order of the Bankruptcy Court, a sale was held at the office of

Roger G. Segal, as trustee, on January 7,1998. Plaintiff appeared at the auction sale with his
counsel for the purposes of bidding for the claims to be sold by the trustee. Defendant Dick
Warner also appeared at the sale with his attorney.
10.

At the conclusion of the sale, Roger Segal sold all claims and potential causes of

action of DMG including the claims asserted against the Defendants herein to Dick Warner. A
copy of the Bill of Sale which assigns and transfers said property to Defendant Media Group

L.C., the designee of Defendant Dick Warner, is attached as Exhibit "D" to Defendants' Opening
Memorandum.
11.

The Bankruptcy Court approved the sale of all claims of DMG Color, Inc. by the

chapter 7 trustee, Roger Segal, to Defendants. As a result of the sale ordered by the United
States Bankruptcy Court, the claims against the Defendants do not belong to the Plaintiff.
12.

The Defendants should be awarded reasonable attorneys fees pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. § 78-27-56 because plaintiffs alleged claims were without merit and not asserted in
good faith based upon the undisputed facts that the claims had been sold by the bankruptcy
trustee to the Defendants in compliance with the order of the United States Bankruptcy Court.
JUDGMENT
Based on the foregoing undisputed facts and conclusions of law, the Court hereby makes
and enters its judgment as follows:
1.

Defendants' motion to dismiss the Plaintiffs complaint with prejudice is hereby

granted, and Plaintiffs complaint is hereby dismissed with prejudice.
2.

Defendants' motion for an award of attorney's fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §

78-27-56 is hereby granted by the Court. Defendants shall file and serve an attorneys fees
affidavit upon the Defendant. Any objection to the reasonableness of the attorney's fees shall be
made within ten days thereafter. If no objection is timely made, then the attorney's fees shall be
approved, and this Judgment shall be augmented thereby.
3.

Judgment for costs incurred in the action is hereby granted in favor of the

Defendants pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

4.

This Judgment isfinalas to the matters ruled upon and shall be entered by the

Clerk, of the Court, there being no reason for delay.
DATED this

A day of

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Judgment was
mailed, postage prepaid, on this /

gay of April, 1999 to the following:

James G. Swensen, Jr.
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
/ f t 2 - * ^ w >W
459934
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing [Revised] Judgment
Dismissing Case was mailed, postage prepaid, on this

day of April, 1999 to the

following:
James G. Swensen, Jr.
39 Exchange Place, Suite 100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Steven W. Call
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
BY THE COURT:

